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After Desert Storm...Desert Dilemmas?
by SluIheen MOZIJffar
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Department ofPolitical Science

The "desert stonn" has passed, but the
Middle East remains suspended in the
vortex of turbulent changes engendered
by global and regional pressures. Stemming from the region's historical geopolitical significance, global pressures in
the fonn of Western involvement have
stimulated rapid economic development,
irreversible social changes and unstable
political modernization, transfonning
the Middle East in uneven and unpredictable ways. Even while attempting to
advance the prosperity of their peoples,
Middle Eastern nations have sought to
preserve their individual cultural
identities in the face of relentless
external pressures and the fundamental
changes they have wrought. In the
process, their social fabric and body
politic have been riven with deep-seated
tensions.
The headline-grabbing crises sparked
by Iraq's reckless invasion and annexation of Kuwait sharply underscored the
explosive volatility of these deeper
tensions in contemporary Middle East.
The riveting "Nintendo" pyrotechnics of
the ensuing Gulf War and the astonishing incompetence of the huge Iraqi
military, armed to the teeth with some of
today's most sophisticated weaponry,
sharply illustrated the dangers and
paradoxes inherent in the clash between
modem technology and archaic cultures.
Although not unique to the Middle East,
but grossly misunderstood in the West,
the deeper tensions in the region result
from the encounter of societies organized around traditional religious beliefs
with the relentless encroachment of a
secular global culture, from the class,
religious, and ethnic divisions that
typically emerge in societies undergoing
economic development and political
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modernization, and from the dynamism
of mass political participation and the
rigidity of authoritarian political institutions. Like all historical transfonnations,
the profound social, economic, and
political changes and the tensions they
produce offer both challenges and
opportunitie~ to the region's leaders and
peoples.
By international standards, the level of
social and economic development in the
Middle East is modest. Relative to the
region's low socioeconomic level in
1960, however, economic growth and
social development (especially health and
education) have been impressive in the
three decades since. According to the
World Bank, Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) for the region averaged an annual
growth rate of about 5%. In the 1970s,
the rate of GDP growth for Saudi Arabia
and Iraq averaged an astounding 10% and
11 %, respectively. More significantly,
economic prosperity fueled popular
expectations of increased job opportunities and improved living standards, to
which all governments in the region
responded by substantially expanding the
service sector. Overall, the brisk pace of
economic development doubled per
capita incomes since 1960.
Economic success in the Middle East
has not been without its problems,
however. Coinciding with the onset of

world-wide recession in the early 1980s,
economic growth began to slow measurably due to a combination of factors.
Inflationary pressures created by the
rapid development of the previous
decade shrank national and individual
earnings in real tenns. For non-oil
producers, debt-service ratio increased as
their demands for imports continued
unabated. For OPEC countries, oil
revenues shrank in real tenns because of
the reduced value of the dollar, the
currency in which oil payments were
made. Energy conservation measures in
industrialized countries reduced demand
for OPEC oil, while the entry of Britain,
Norway, Mexico, and the Soviet Union
into the world oil market further cut into
OPEC oil revenues. Finally, conflict
within OPEC over pricing and cheating
by members on production quotas
undennined the cartel's monopoly over
the world oil market. In 1986, the
market crashed, as world oil prices
plummeted from $35-a-barrel in 1981 to
$20-a-barrel in 1986. This was most
dramatically evident in the precipitous
drop in Saudi Arabia's oil revenues from
$113 billion in 1981 to $19 billion in
1986.
Economic prosperity also created deep
social divisions and explosive political
tensions which were now intensified by
the economic slowdown. Across the

region, economic slowdown not only
dashed expectations of continued good
fortune raised by the prosperity, but also
exposed the uneven benefits it bestowed.
The oil-rich Gulf states, for instance,
enjoy one of the world's highest living
standards which cannot be matched
anywhere in the region. This has become
a special source of seething discontent in
the region's less fortunate countries,
where the rich conservative rulers of the
Gulf states are viewed as violating the
Koranic injunction concerning the
responsibility of the rich to share their
wealth. Additionally, these countries
have not only been directly hit by the
recession, but have also witnessed a sharp
drop in valuable foreign remittances from
their citizens working in the Gulf states,
because these states have retrenched the
large expatriate labor force in response to
the same region-wide recession. Saddam
Hussein readily exploited this discontent,
as he sought to give his invasion of
Kuwait an aura of populist Pan-Arab
legitimacy.
Within individual countries, economic
prosperity improved health care, increasing life expectancy. But the limited
success of family planning programs in
Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, and Morocco and
their total failure in other countries of the
region have contributed to rapid population growth, vitiating any sustained
benefits of economic prosperity for the
people. Moreover, the shift from agriculture to manufacturing and industry
encouraged massive rural-to-urban
migration, swelling the population of
cities. More dangerously, the teeming
urban populations, hurt by the recessioninduced cutbacks in government consumer subsidies, have become readily
susceptible to violent political mobilization by the growing numbers of both
religious and secular extremist groups.
One such group assassinated Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat in October of
1981. Others, financially backed by

Libya, Syria, Iran, or Iraq, and even by
local merchants hurt by the cut-backs in
consumer subsidies and channeling
money to them through the tightly-knit
informal networks of the bazaars, have
constructed elaborate infrastructures,
providing social services and economic
support to the alienated urban masses. In
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon,
for example, extremist groups have
established secular and religious schools
for children, literacy classes for adults,
vocational training for unemployed
youth, as well as extensive but informal
financial networks which channel credit
and capital for business enterprises.
Popular political support for extremist
groups in the Middle East is thus rooted
neither in the supposed fanatacism of
these groups nor in the ostensible
irrationality of those who support them.
Instead, it stems logically and rationally
from the precarious material conditions
and harsh realities of daily existence
fostered by the abject failure of Westernsupported authoritarian regimes in the
region to even recognize the need for,
much less secure, a semblance of
distributive justice in the face of impressive macroeconomic development and
overall prosperity.
Reinforcing the social inequities that
spawn political extremism are the class
divisions fostered by state-led strategies
of economic development. As elsewhere,
these strategies have been the key to
economic prosperity in the Middle East.
But also as elswhere, they have proven to
be a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, state-led growth policies created
new social classes - an urban workingclass dependent exclusively on wage
labor, a sizable lower-middle class of
traders, shopkeepers, and other selfemployed entrepreneurs engaged in low
capital-intensive enterprises with small
profit margins, and a rapidly growing
educated middle class comprised of
government bureaucrats, professionals,

and big businessmen and industrialists
often closely allied to Western multinational corporations - who perceive their
long-term prosperity tied to the continuation of these policies. On the other
hand, the structural imbalances inherent
in economic development undermined the
legitimacy of state-led growth policies.
In particular, the private sector and allied
middle-class groups now saw their
futures threatened by the continuation of
these policies under regimes becoming
increasingly authoritarian in the face of
growing discontent among the lower- and
lower-middle classes. These political
pressures, combined with the 1980s'
recession and the demands by Western
donors (e.g. the United States) and
lending agencies (e.g. the International
Monetary Fund) for structural adjustment, have forced Middle Eastern states
to institute infitah (economic liberation).
Entailing a general move from planned to
a market economy, shift of investment
resources from the urban to the rural
sector and from the public to the private
sector, increased foreign investments and
production for exports instead of domestic consumption, infitah hurts all groups,
but those in the lower socioeconomic
ladder more than others. This unequal
impact of economic liberalization has
accentuated sharp income and lifestyle
differences and intensified class antagonisms.
Religion and ethnicity also fragment
Middle Eastern societies. However,
religious and ethnic conflicts in the
region, as anywhere, are not immutably
rooted in visible differences in language,
behavior, and lifestyles. These characteristics define the social boundaries
separating groups engaged in competition
and identify the political criteria on which
status and resources are to be allocated.
For instance, Palestinians are Arabs, and
there are Christian as well as Muslim
Palestinians. But the consolidation of a
separate Palestinian ethnic identity
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occurred as a result of their inferior
social, economic, and political status in
communities with which they came into
contact throughout the Middle East.
Also, religion and ethnicity interact with
each other, and with class divisions, to
create multiple identities. Which identity
is invoked will depend on the social
context of political conflict. For instance,
Israeli law guarantees the rights of all
citizens, but the law is applied differently
for Arab and Jewish citizens. In the
context of Arab-Jewish conflict, then,
socially constructed ethnicity becomes
the basis for applying the same law
differently. In the context of Israeli
politics, however, social bases of support
for the major parties show the political
relevance of the historical distinction
between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews.
The former, traditionally dominating
Israeli social, economic, and political life,
tend to vote for the liberal Labor Party.
The latter, traditionally predominating in
lower-middle classes, tend to vote for the
conservative Likud Party. Sephardims,
moreover, had more in common culturally with Palestinians who remained in
Israel after 1948 than with the Ashkenazims with whom they shared little
except their Jewish identity. Over the
years, however, forced by the Ashkenazims' negative stereotyping of all
Arabs, Sephardims have made a concerted effort to differentiate themselves
from the Palestinians. They have also
moved up the socioeconomic ladder as
Palestinians from the West Bank and
Gaza have taken over the lowest of
menial jobs in Israel. Finally, there is
growing evidence that the recent influx of
large numbers of Russian Jews, many of
whom are middle-class professionals,
may exacerbate class and ethnic divisions
in Israel.
In the Middle East, as anywhere, class,
ethnicity, and religion combine in
complex and mutable ways to produce
highly volatile social conditions in which
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multiple identities can propel political
conflicts in unpredictable directions. And
because most states in the region are run
by authoritarian regimes (Turkey and
Israel are the only liberal democracies,
although Turkey has also experienced
military rule), peaceful channels of
political expressions are virtually nonexistent. Social conflicts legitimized in
the idiom of religion and ethnicity
inevitably explode into political violence,
increasingly pushing the coping abilities
of these regimes to the limit. In Iran in
1979, they exploded in a revolutionary
upheaval which overthrew the Shah,
bringing Ayatollah Khomeini's Muslim
fundamentalist regime to power. The
Iranian revolution posed a dangerous
challenge to both the politically and
socially conservative regimes of the
Persian Gulf and the politically conservative but socially progressive regimes
elsewhere in the region. The former
responded by repressing political dissent,
especially after 1987 when Iranian
pilgrims visiting Mecca for the hajj
instigated violent demonstrations, and by
creating the Gulf Cooperation Council to
coordinate mutual security arrangements
against revolutionary threats from Iran.
Other regimes have responded by a
combination of intensified repression
(Syria and Iraq) and limited reform
(Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan). The
success of these strategies remains
uncertain.
In general, the tension between social
turmoil engendered by dashed expectations of continued prosperity and rigid
political institutions unable to move
things forward again makes all Middle
Eastern governments vulnerable to
popular disaffection. Some form of
political liberalization to accompany the
current wave of economic liberalization
in the region seems almost certain.
Labelling them as democratization is
risky. Successful democratization
requires sustained economic prosperity to

satisfy the demands of newly-enfranchised groups. With a reported global
shortage of investment capital, it is
uncertain if Middle Eastern economies
can grow fast enough to meet increased
popular demands. Moreover, democracy
requires a culture which tolerates
diversity of views, including distasteful
ones. No Middle Eastern country, not
even Israel with its much-vaunted
commitment to democratic values, comes
even close to fostering such a culture,
protestations from the region to the
contrary notwithstanding. Further yet,
democracy ultimately rests on the
sanctity of individual rights, including the
right of one individual to discriminate
against another. Neither government nor
people will tolerate such rights in a
region where group identities supersede
individual autonomy and political
animosities run deep. The plight of the
Kurds is tragically symptomatic of this.
Absolutely no one in the region has come
to their support. Finally, the push for
liberalization in the Middle East, ostensibly being spearheaded by the historical
carriers of liberal values, the secular
Westernized middle-class, may yet turn
out to be the most ironic of twists in
Middle Eastern political development.
Tentative steps toward political pluralism
in Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan indicate
that Muslim religious fundamentalists,
for whom anything Western is anathema,
will readily capitalize on the popular
disaffection with infitah and insensitive
Western-supported rulers to emerge
victorious in the great game of democratic elections.
It may, therefore, behoove any wouldbe peacemakers, especially outsiders who
scarcely understand the nuanced complexities of Middle Eastern societies, to
heed carefully Princeton historian Charles
Issawi's apposite aphorism: "God sent
Moses, and he couldn't fix it; He sent
Jesus, and he couldn't fix it; He sent
Muhammad, and he couldn't fix it."~

